Why do we need to broaden affordable housing funding sources?

Because you get things like this 44-unit 1992 LIHTC property that loses $25,000 per year with no hard debt.

Housingpolicy.org, an initiative of the Center for Housing Policy is doing yeoman’s work in spurring ongoing conversations amongst professionals in affordable house. At their nascent forums, Ed Kaminski shares his frustration with the deal above, and its inability to make financial sense.

[Pennsylvania's] low rent levels do speed up the intersection of operating expense with operating income. We even avoid hard debt on tax credit deals whenever possible because at some point, costs will exceed income. This is certainly true in hindsite with taxes, utilities, insurance and maintenance all rising at a greater rent than rents.

We are being offered – free of charge – a 17 year old 44 unit tax credit property that losses $25,000 per year. It has no hard debt payments, but soft debt exceeds the appraised value. [We] have come to the conclusion that the only way to preserve this is to find a source that will subsidize operations. We are willing to enter into a 15 year restrictive use agreement in exchange for a 15 year commitment of $25,000 per year.

That is $568 per unit per year ($8520 per unit for 15 years) and a total of $375,000 of subsidy for 15 years. Producing 44 new units will cost $6-8,000,000 or more.

The ability of a State Housing Agency to exchange tax credits for cash does nothing if the money goes simply to the construction of affordable housing and not to its operations. Financial stability, much less sustainability, will not occur until states and more importantly, counties, become more serious about providing and supporting affordable housing.

LIHTC cannot solve this problem.

Direct HUD subsidies, HOPE VI, vouchers, all are powerless to solve the long term danger to affordable housing: incomes (and thereby rents) do not rise in concert with expenses.